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VICTIM'S CONDUCT 
EXPLORING DEPARTURES BASED ON THE 
VICTIM'S WRONGFUL CONDUCT: 
U.S. V. KOON 
Tracey L. Meares* 
In United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (CD. 
Cal. 1993), the district court sentenced Stacey Koon 
and Laurence Powell, two Los Angeles police officers, 
to 30 months imprisonment and two years supervised 
release for depriving the victim, Rodney King, of his 
constitutional rights under color of state law. 
The 30-month sentences were substantially 
below the guideline range of 70 to 87 months. To 
reach the 30-month level the court relied on two 
theories of departure, one of which was the wrongful 
conduct of the victim.1 The factual context in Koon 
differed greatly from cases in which the departure 
provision previously had been applied. The Ninth 
Circuit found the departure unjustified and reversed. 
United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Many would argue, and I agree, that the Ninth 
Circuit's repudiation of the sentencing court's 
departure in the Koon case is justified. However, the 
Circuit interprets too narrowly ?5K2.10, which allows 
sentencing courts to depart from the guidelines when 
the victim's wrongful conduct contributes signifi 
cantly to provoking the offense behavior. The Ninth 
Circuit's reading of ?5K2.10 is not supported by the 
text, nor does it make sense as a policy matter. 
Moreover, the opinion offers little guidance on what 
constitutes the proper degree of departure under 
?5K2.10. The end result is that sentencing courts are 
given little discretion to use ?5K2.10 to depart in 
other civil rights cases and possibly in cases outside 
that context. 
L THE VICTIM CONDUCT POLICY 
STATEMENT (?5K2.10) 
That a defendant's punishment should be 
adjusted to account for the fact that his criminal 
conduct occurred in response to wrongful conduct by 
the victim is probably not a controversial claim. In 
fact, it might strike many people as an intuitive 
concept. This intuition is embodied in homicide 
doctrine, which traditionally has considered premedi 
tated homicides to be more serious than those 
committed "in the heat of passion." The latter are 
designated "manslaughter" and penalized less 
severely than intentional homicides. 
The federal sentencing guidelines have extended 
this intuition to apply to all violent offenses and some 
non-violent offenses. Section 5K2.10 provides: 
If the victim's wrongful conduct contributed 
significantly to provoking the offense behavior, 
* Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. 
the court may reduce the sentence below the 
guideline range to reflect the nature and circum 
stances of the offense. In deciding the extent of a 
sentence reduction, the court should consider: 
(a) the size and strength of the victim, or other 
relevant physical characteristics, in comparison 
with those of the defendant; 
(b) the persistence of the victim's conduct and 
any efforts by the defendant to prevent confronta 
tion; 
(c) the danger reasonably perceived by the 
defendant, including the victim's reputation for 
violence; 
(d) the danger actually presented to the 
defendant by the victim; and 
(e) any other relevant conduct by the victim 
that substantially contributed to the danger 
presented. 
Sentencing courts have discussed their reliance 
on ?5K2.10 in a few published cases. Many involve 
assault resulting in serious bodily injury on Indian 
reservations. Others include the mailing of threaten 
ing letters, extortion, and, interestingly, manslaugh 
ter^ 
II. THE SENTENCING COURT'S VIEW 
In the Koon case, Judge John G. Davies decided 
that ?5K2.10 was relevant in sentencing two police 
officers convicted of using unreasonable force to 
arrest Rodney Glen King. Judge Davies's sentencing 
memorandum states that King's wrongful conduct 
significantly contributed to provoking the unlawful 
conduct of the officers such that their "conduct fell 
outside the range of the more typical offenses for 
which the Guidelines were designed." 
The sentencing court pointed to several examples 
of King's "illegal conduct" prior to and during his 
arrest: that he was intoxicated, that he exceeded the 
speed limit, and that he failed to stop his car even 
after the police flashed him. The court also observed 
that King was slow to obey orders, that he attempted 
to escape custody, that he is a big man and was a 
felony suspect at the time of the incident, relying on 
?5K2.10(a) and (c): "From the time of that first baton 
blow until 1:07:28 [referring to the frames of the 
famous Holliday tape] when the defendants' conduct 
crossed the line to illegality, Mr. King persisted in his 
failure to obey the police." 
To the extent that the sentencing court relied on 
King's wrongful conduct as but-for causation of the 
entire incident, the court's interpretation of "signifi 
cant provocation" in ?5K2.10 seems rather weak. A 
portion of his opinion deserves greater attention, 
however: the relationship between volatility of the 
arrest situation and departures under ?5K2.10. 
The volatility analysis has two parts. One deals 
with but-for causation: 
While Mr. King's wrongdoing precipitated the 
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initial, lawful use of force, and thereby substan 
tially contributed to the offense conduct,... [t]he 
Court recognizes that by the time the defendants' 
conduct crossed the line to unlawfulness, Mr. 
King was no longer resisting arrest-Neverthe 
less, the incident would not escalated to this point, 
indeed it would not have occurred at all, but for 
Mr. King's initial conduct. 
That statement might be generalized as follows: In an 
excessive force case the victim's wrongful conduct can 
precipitate an incident in which a volatile arrest situation 
will ensue. In a volatile arrest situation we might expect 
the line between the lawful and unlawful conduct of a law 
enforcement officer to be very thin. 
This part of the volatility argument suggests that 
there might be cases in which a victim's misconduct 
and resistance played a substantial part in provoking 
the police officer's conduct so that the sentence should 
be mitigated. 
The second part of the volatility argument 
focuses on the officer's response to the victim's 
provocative conduct: 
Police officers are always armed with 'dangerous 
weapons' and may legitimately employ those 
weapons to administer reasonable force. Where 
an officer's initial use of force is provoked and 
lawful, the line between legal arrest and an 
unlawful deprivation of civil rights within the 
aggravated assault guideline is relatively thin. 
[But] the criminal conduct of a state officer who 
launches an unprovoked assault on an individual 
in custody is dissimilar to the conduct of defen 
dants Koon and Powell who, at least initially, 
were incited to use force. . .. [T]he sentence 
imposed must reflect this disparity. 
This part of the argument reflects a more cat 
egorical approach in contrast to the first part of the 
volatility argument, which is more case-specific. The 
court argued that police officers are much more likely 
to be involved in dynamic arrest situations where 
some use of force is legitimate. Therefore, the 
argument goes, these officers should not be con 
demned in the same manner as state officials who are 
sentenced under ?2H4.1, for engaging in unprovoked 
and deliberate assaults. 
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S REVERSAL 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the sentencing court's 
?5K2.10 departure analysis for three reasons. Its 
narrow interpretation of ?5K2.10 seems inconsistent 
with the policy statement's text and with the applica 
tion of the departure provision in prior cases. The 
Circuit failed to address the sentencing court's two 
part volatility argument, which has merit in some 
cases even if not in this one. 
A. The Temporal Link to Victim Misconduct 
First, the appellate court explained that the lower | 
court's analysis was faulty because it did not link 
adequately King's wrongful conduct to the defen 
dants' wrongful conduct. Capitalizing on the 
sentencing court's statement that King's wrongful 
conduct was the "initial provocation for the subse 
quent course of events," the Circuit implied that the 
sentencing court had to presume that King's wrong 
ful conduct precipitated both the lawful and unlaw 
ful conduct of the officers. Then the appellate court 
argued that this concept of but-for causation was 
simply too broad to fit within ?5K2.10 because a but 
for causation analysis required no victim misconduct 
to justify a departure. The Circuit used as evidence 
that the sentencing court's theory was overbroad the 
fact that they found King's wrongful conduct to have 
subsided by the time the officers' unlawful conduct 
began. 
At first blush, the Ninth Circuit's description of 
the sentencing court's but-for analysis of provocation 
as too-inclusive seems persuasive. However the 
Circuit cannot be right that a but-for causation 
definition of provocation would not require any 
victim misconduct to justify a departure because 
?5K2.10 does require misconduct. Therefore, the 
image that the Circuit attempted to invoke?that 
future police officer-defendants would be able to 
avail themselves of departures under ?5K2.10 
because the victim happened to be innocently 
walking down the street when a police officer 
decides to engage in an unprovoked attack?does not 
help a reader to understand the flaw with the 
sentencing court's opinion. 
Another problem with the first prong of the 
Ninth Circuit's view is the court's reliance on the fact 
that King's misconduct had already subsided by the 
time the defendants' unlawful conduct began. The 
panel implied that the provocation concept embodied 
in ?5K2.10 demands a short temporal link between 
the victim's provocative wrongful conduct and the 
defendants' subsequent offense. The rationale for 
a 
relatively short time lapse between victim's provoca 
tive wrongful conduct and the defendant's subse 
quent offense is straightforward. If the time lapse is 
very long, a defendant's conduct starts to look like 
planned revenge rather than a response the law 
considers justified because the act was committed "in 
the heat of passion." 
The traditional concept of cooling-off time in 
manslaughter doctrine might offer support by 
analogy to a temporal requirement in ?5K2.10. If too 
much time passes between the provoking event and 
the defendant's subsequent conduct, we might decide 
that the wrongful conduct of the victim no longer 
contributes significantly to provoking the offense 
behavior. However, even the cooling time rationale 
in manslaughter cases does not require that the 
defendant's conduct be simultaneous with the 
victim's provoking conduct, which is the standard 
implied by the Ninth Circuit in Koon. 
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Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the 
text of the policy statement does not require such a 
narrow temporal constraint. In fact, the text of the 
relevant subheadings of the policy statement militates 
in the opposite direction, for it specifically allows 
victim misconduct that occurred prior to the incident 
to be considered. ?5K2.10(b) refers to the persistence 
of the defendant's conduct, ?5K2.10(c) refers to 
danger reasonably perceived by the defendant, 
including the victim's reputation for violence, and the 
catch-all ?5K2.10(e) mentions any other relevant 
conduct by the victim. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's own illustrative 
example of a possible case for a ?5K2.10 departure, a 
case in which a victim harms an officer's partner in 
the officer's presence, does not seem to require such a 
strict temporal link. The Circuit simply added an 
unnecessary requirement to ?5K2.10 departure 
analysis by relying on a strict temporal requirement 
to bolster the strength of its attack on what it per 
ceives as the over-inclusiveness of the sentencing 
court's but-for causation analysis. 
B. Volatility 
The Ninth Circuit's second argument against the 
?5K2.10 is framed around the following question: 
was it legally permissible for the sentencing court to 
find that a 5-level departure was justified because of 
the proximity between King's wrongful conduct, 
which had subsided by the time the officers' wrong 
ful conduct commenced, and the "volatility" of the 
arrest situation? 
The panel's answer, "No," was grounded in 
an 
analysis of the substantive law of excessive force 
claims set out in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 
(1989). 
Graham directs juries to consider the volatility of 
the arrest situation in determining whether police 
officers are liable for civil rights violations flowing 
from unreasonable use of force in the arrest context. 
Thus, Graham teaches that the dynamic arrest 
situation that the sentencing court in Koon found to be 
unusual enough to consider for ?5K2.10 departure 
analysis is not unusual at all. Rather, the volatility of 
the arrest situation is a factor inherent in excessive 
force cases. Therefore, said the Circuit, the volatility 
of the arrest situation cannot be unusual enough to 
justify a departure from the heartland of offenses 
contemplated by ?2H1.4. 
This part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion is much 
more persuasive than its first attack. But it too is 
flawed because of its rigidity. 
The most direct way to address it is to ask: Are 
there cases in which the sentencing judge reasonably 
could conclude that the volatility of the situation 
could justify a departure even though the jury has 
already taken volatility into account at the liability 
stage? I think the answer should be yes. But the 
Ninth Circuit's reasoning removes categorically from 
the sentencing judge's consideration factors over 
which the jury deliberated at the liability stage in 
excessive force cases. 
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion is at odds with the 
opinions of other courts addressing the applicability 
of Part K departures. For example, in United States v. 
Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1992), the court held it 
an error for the trial judge to treat the jury's rejection 
of a battered woman defense to murder as precluding 
a downward departure under ?5K2.10 on the same 
evidence. The Whitetail court relied on United States v. 
Cheape, 889 F.2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1989), which explained 
that sentencing departures on the basis of coercion or 
duress must be read more broadly than situations in 
which those factors are used to provide a complete 
defense. To read the provisions otherwise, the court 
stated, would render the policy statements meaning 
less. 
It is unpersuasive to argue that because the 
volatility of the arrest situation is considered, along 
with many other factors, in the course of the jury's 
decision to impose liability, factors such as the 
volatility of the arrest and the victim's misconduct are 
not relevant at sentencing. 
The volatility of the situation and the relationship 
between the volatility of the arrest and the particular 
victim's misconduct might be better addressed and 
refined at sentencing than at the liability stage. 
Considering this relationship at sentencing allows 
judges the discretion necessary to make 
contextualized decisions that recognize the differ 
ences between official misconduct that is deliberate 
and misconduct that occurs as reasonable force 
"morphs" into unreasonable force during an arrest. 
Interpretations such as the Ninth Circuit's that 
link the departures to the success of a defense at the 
liability stage limit departures in a categorical manner 
that undermines even the very limited amount of 
discretionary sentencing afforded sentencing courts 
under the guidelines. 
C. Analogy to Deliberate Assaults 
Third, the Ninth Circuit attacked the sentencing 
court's attempt to distinguish law enforcement 
officers in excessive force cases from corrections 
officers who engage in deliberate and unprovoked 
assaults. Both groups of officials are subject to 
sentencing under ?2H1.4 which is titled Interference 
with Civil Rights Under Color of Law. This section 
makes no distinction between uses of force that 
initially are lawful and those that are not. 
The sentencing court saw the law enforcement 
officer's use of excessive force in the volatile arrest 
situation as fundamentally different from and 
exculpating as compared to the case of a correction 
officer or other state agent (including a police officer) 
who intentionally uses a dangerous weapon to assault 
a victim without legitimate cause. The sentencing 
court was concerned that the stringent Aggravated 
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Assault guideline ?2A2.2, which applied to the Koon 
case through ?2H1.4, was applicable to a "heartland" 
of deliberate and unprovoked assaults. Because the 
Koon case involved an assault following from a 
volatile arrest situation, the court deemed a departure 
necessary. 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed after evaluating the 
sentencing court's analysis: "The fact that appellants 
were authorized to use some force in this case does 
not mitigate the fact that they used too much. Under 
the structure and policies of the Guidelines, it makes 
it worse." The Circuit made a very good point. 
Unfortunately, it did not address the puzzle that the 
sentencing court attempted to solve. 
Both the sentencing court and the circuit take 
rigid, categorical approachs that are inappropriate to 
the complex issues inherent to excessive force 
cases. 
The sentencing court suggested that all uses of force 
by police officers in the arrest context are similar to 
each other and dissimilar to unprovoked and deliber 
ate uses of force by state officials outside the arrest 
context. The Circuit suggested that volatility never 
could be considered at sentencing because the jury 
considered that factor at the liability stage. 
The Ninth Circuit relied on the forceful notion 
that ?2H1.4 correctly punishes more severely official 
misconduct than comparable conduct by private 
actors. The Circuit additionally pointed out that the 
fact that Koon and Powell were authorized to use 
some force in this case did not mitigate the fact that 
they used too much. 
It is difficult to argue against these two state 
ments. Moreover, it is understandable that the Circuit 
discussed the distinction between private and public 
actors in light of the fact that it characterized the 
sentencing court's discussion of its departure from the 
aggravated assault guidelines 
as an "implicit contrast 
between appellants [Koon and Powell] and civilian 
offenders." 
But considering the distinction between public 
and private actors does not help solve the puzzle of 
how deliberate misconduct by officials and miscon 
duct by officials occurring in situations where initial 
use of force is justified should be treated at sentenc 
ing. It is similarly unhelpful to point out that Koon's 
and Powell's limited authority to use some force in 
the volatile arrest situation does not justify use of 
excessive force. The puzzle we need to solve assumes 
the second point from the beginning. The Ninth 
Circuit does not address the implications of the 
sentencing court's forceful argument that we might 
view as more reprehensible the excessive use of force 
by government officials that has absolutely no 
explanation. 
A better analysis would recognize that the 
appropriate comparison is between groups of officials 
engaging in misconduct under two different circum 
stances, rather than comparing private individuals 
and public individuals. Since civil rights violations 
flowing from uses of unreasonable force almost 
always involve some kind of misconduct by the 
victim in the course of a likely volatile arrest situa 
tion, perhaps the Sentencing Commission failed to 
take these factors into account in determining the 
heartland offenses for the aggravated assault 
guideline and the criminal civil rights guideline? 
contrary to the sentencing court's conclusion. 
Though it did not say so, it is more likely that the 
Commission believed that sentencing courts could 
accommodate some of the differences between these 
two groups of officials through variations in sen 
tences along the guideline range. Since the 
Commisison did not say so and since 18 U.S.C. 
3553(b) indicates that the Commission has a burden 
to make its decisions clear, courts probably should 
have more discretion to depart in these cases. And, 
to the extent that these differences cannot be accom 
modated, we could easily conclude that the case of 
unprovoked and deliberate assault by a state official 
demands an upward departure from the guideline 
sentence. 
IV. A BETTER VIEW 
Even if variations along the guideline range can 
accommodate differences between the two groups of 
officials first discussed, the idea of significant 
provocation in the volatile arrest situation is still 
relevant to analyze a sentence. A serious analysis 
should address head-on the fact that provocation 
must include some assessment of the defendant's 
mental state in addition to the victim's wrongful 
conduct. 
Several questions are relevant to whether a 
?5K2.10 departure is justified in an excessive force 
case. The sentencing judge should ask what the 
circumstances were, what kind of force was used, 
what the mental state of the defendant was, and what 
was the victim's wrongful conduct. 
Even if the heartland offenses contemplated by 
the assault guideline as applied to police officers in 
civil rights cases take into consideration that arrests 
generally are volatile and occur in response to at least 
some misconduct on the victim's part, that heartland 
cannot describe every case. There is a difference 
between the arrestee who merely struggles and the 
arrestee who assaults the arresting officer. Both cases 
involve volatile arrest situations. Both could involve 
exercises of unreasonable force on the officer's part. 
The second case might justify a departure under 
?5K2.10. 
Koon might be difficult case to consider a ?5K2.10 
departure for reasons that go beyond the inherent 
difficulties of using this departure provision in 
excessive force cases, which almost always involve 
some kind of victim misconduct and in which the 
defendant is rightly held to a higher standard than a 
continued on page 213 
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within ? 242: the statute criminalizes the deprivation of all 
Constitutional rights. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,803, 
16 L. Ed. 2d 267,86 S. Ct. 1152 (1966) (discussing legislative 
history). Hence "once a due process right has been made 
specific by court decisions, that right is encompassed by ? 
242." United States v. Langer, 958 F.2d 522,524 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The rights 
King was deprived of have been clearly established for 
decades, and willful conduct which deprived him of those 
rights falls within the heartland of both the statute and the 
Guidelines. The fact that willful violators of the rights at 
issue in this case may not be prosecuted as often as other 
violators of ? 242 does not alter the analysis. In itself it says 
nothing about individual culpability, although it may say 
something about evidentiary difficulties and about the 
litigation strategies of the federal government. 
38 We do not conclude that a departure for victim 
misconduct would never be permissible in a police case. Such 
a departure might be appropriate, where, for example, the 
victim kills or wounds an officer's partner in his presence. In 
such a case, victim misconduct plays a role similar to that 
played by provocation in the more usual crimes of passion: 
the defendant is to a certain extent excused because he was 
seized by passion, and acted in the heat of the moment. This 
appears to have been the rationale in those cases where 
departures under ? 5K2.10 were affirmed. See United States v. 
Tsosie, 14 F.3d 1438 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Yellow 
Earrings, 891 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1989) (assaults triggered by 
sexual jealousy or humiliation). This is distinguishable from 
the district court's rationale, which relies on the vicissitudes 
of police work, and the difficulty in drawing the line between 
proper and improper uses of force. 
Meares?continued from page 204 
civilian.* These reasons include the national 
attention focused on the case due to the poten 
tially explosive race, ethnic, and class issues. 
The exceptional nature of the case and the 
explosive history could explain the Ninth 
Circuit's overly rigid response to Judge 
Davies's departures, for discretion can be 
dangerous in these cases in a way that many 
people rightfully consider to be illegitimate. 
But it goes without saying that discretion 
can be a good as well. Allowing the sentencing 
court even limited discretion permits it to make 
more contextualized, more precise, and better 
decisions. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 The other basis of departure was the convergence of 
three factors?additional punishment in the form of prison 
abuse and exposure to multiple adversarial proceedings; the 
absence of need to protect the public from these defendants; 
and the "unusual circumstance" of the defendants' indict 
ment after the state court verdict. 
2 
Allowing a departure from a guidelines sentence for 
manslaughter seems like double-counting since the substan 
tive law of homicide takes provocation into account by 
downgrading the defendant's offense. Nevertheless in United 
States v. Tsosie, 14 F.3d 1438 (10th Cir. 1994), the sentencing 
court departed from the sentence range of 41-51 months to 
one of 4-10 months on a charge of manslaughter occurring in 
Indian country to which defendant pleaded guilty 
. Tsosie Was 
sentenced to four months in a half-way house. 
